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Abstract
This survey paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from
non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory.
Solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much
to pollute, games where players make decisions about treaty participation, and
games where players make decisions about treaty ratication, are examined. The
implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other
issues, such as trade, is examined. Cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to
coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behaviour of coalitions
cooperating on climate change.
One way to achieve cooperation is to design a game, known as a mechanism,
whose equilibrium corresponds to an optimal outcome. This paper examines some
mechanisms that are based on conditional commitments, and could lead to substan-
tial cooperation.
Key Words and Phrases. Climate change negotiations; game theory; implemen-
tation theory; coalition formation; subgame perfect equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
A key reason why achieving international cooperation to address climate change is di-
cult is that there are strong free-rider incentives. These incentives arise because climate
change mitigation is a global public good { everyone benets from there being less global
warming, and everyone has an incentive for someone else to take on the burden of emission
reductions. This is compounded by the fact that because of sovereignty issues, interna-
tional institutions are weak compared to national ones. Game theory, which analyses the
mathematics of strategic behaviour, can help us obtain a better understanding of how
the incentive to free-ride works, identify the potential barriers to cooperation, and nd
approaches to facilitate a cooperative outcome. This paper surveys the game theoretic
literature that relates to climate change, with an emphasis on approaches that try to
nd ways to facilitate cooperation. Our work complements previous surveys (Finus, 2001;
Barrett, 2003) because it is more recent, and is also shorter.
Game theory is often applied by assuming that the game is given, and used to predict
the behaviour of participants. But an area of game theory known as implementation
theory treats the desired outcome as given, and asks how to design a process that leads to
this outcome (Jackson, 2001). An example of such as process could be the negotiations for
an international environmental agreement. This approach may help us design processes
that are more likely to lead to cooperative outcomes.
Addressing the free-rider incentives associated with climate change mitigation requires
that we nd mechanisms to facilitate cooperation between states. One such approach is
international treaty-making. In 1992, countries negotiated the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since then, countries have negotiated the
Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, which included emissions reduction commitments for
some developed countries, known as Annex I countries. Countries have been engaging in
further negotiations at conferences of parties to the UNFCCC and meetings of parties to
the Kyoto Protocol.
The diculties with nding cooperation were illustrated in the 2009 Copenhagen cli-
mate negotiations, which resulted in a political accord, but where after years of nego-
tiations there remained too much disagreement between nations to arrive at a binding
international treaty. There has been an ongoing political debate about the role of the
United Nations, and whether more could be achieved in negotiations involving smaller
groups of countries. The Copenhagen negotiations may have made the latter more likely.
The lead US climate change negotiator, Todd Stern, stated: \You cant negotiate in a
group of 192 countries. Its ridiculous to think that you could" (Little, 2010). Nicholas
Stern has oered a dierent perspective, stating that \The fact of Copenhagen and the
setting of the deadline two years previously at Bali did concentrate minds, and it did
lead...to quite specic plans from countries that hadn't set them out before", and that
it was vital to stick with the UN process, whatever its frustrations (Black, 2010).Climate Change and Game Theory 4
Game theory can provide useful insights when considering debates such as these. In
fact, there has been a parallel debate in the game theory literature (see Section 3) on
whether cooperation is more likely to arise from a `grand coalition' of all countries, or
from smaller coalitions. Game theory provides insight both into the stability of coalitions,
and the implications of dierent processes for forming coalitions.
Game theory is relevant to questions involving participation, compliance, and enforce-
ment of international climate agreements. Because international institutions are weak, it
is dicult to enforce an agreed outcome. One issue that has been raised is the role that
the threat of trade restrictions could play in prevention of free-riding.
When using a model to help understand a problem, it is important to be aware of the
limitations of the model. Many applications of game theory require that decision makers
are rational. That is, they have clear preferences, form expectations about unknowns,
and make decisions that are consistent with these preferences and expectations. These
assumptions may not be consistent with experimental psychology. Occasionally it is
possible to devise experiments which can test these assumptions in the context of a game.
This is done with the ultimatum game, which we describe in Example 2.3. The results
suggest that human actions depend on concepts of fairness and reciprocity as well as
purely rational and strategic considerations.
Ostrom (2009) has considered the the role that human behaviour considerations relate
to cooperation problems, and applied this to climate change. She found that a `surpris-
ingly large number of individuals facing collective action problems do cooperate'. She also
found that cooperation is more likely if people gain reputations for being trustworthy re-
ciprocators; reliable information is available about costs and benets of action; individuals
have a long-term time horizon; and are not in a highly competitive environment.
In many of the situations that we describe here, countries are assumed to be the
players in the game. That is, they are assumed to have clear preferences, usually based
on the aggregate welfare of the countries citizens. In reality, dierent citizens have greatly
dierent preferences, and the decision making is based on a political process. An example
of this is the process of treaty ratication, which we will discuss in Example 2.4.
Despite the above limitations of our methodology, many of the mechanisms described
here are important because their game theoretic solutions are cooperative. If humans
are more cooperative than predicted by game theory, these mechanisms may still lead
to cooperative outcomes. Mechanisms that are expected to lead to cooperation can also
be further tested using behavioural experiments. The game theoretic investigation of
cooperative mechanisms may ultimately facilitate cooperation.
In Section 2, we introduce games where players make decisions independently. We dis-
cuss both the normal form representation of a game and the extensive form representation
of a game. We investigate the role of solution concepts including the Nash equilibrium
and the subgame perfect equilibrium. We study examples such as the prisoner's dilemma,Climate Change and Game Theory 5
repeated prisoner's dilemmas, the ultimatum game, games of treaty participation, games
of treaty ratication, and game theoretic approaches to bargaining. We investigate a ba-
sic framework for studying what happens when countries have a continuous choice about
how much they reduce their emissions.
In Section 3, we examine situations where players can cooperate with each other and
form coalitions, which may then behave non-cooperatively when interacting with other
coalitions. We introduce transferrable utility games, in which players within a coalition
can make payments to each other. We examine the concept of the core, where a grand
coalition that includes all players does form, and no smaller coalitions have an incentive
to break away. We discuss an interesting result, due to Chander & Tulkens (1997), that if
a grand coalition for reducing emissions was to dissolve into singletons when any coalition
breaks away, then full cooperation is possible. We also discuss non-cooperative mecha-
nisms for a coalition formation, and apply this to the question of whether cooperation is
more likely among a grand coalition, or among several smaller coalitions.
In Section 4, we look at applications of implementation theory to climate change. We
examine mechanisms for getting players to agree to a socially optimal outcome, including
one which also induces them to reveal their mitigation costs. We also look at some
mechanisms for providing public goods when there may not be strong institutions, and
how that relates to emissions reductions in an international context. Section 5 concludes.
2 Non-cooperative Games and Climate Change
In non-cooperative games, players make decisions independently. We dene some of the
relevant ways of representing non-cooperative games and solution concepts. We illustrate
these denitions with a number of examples that are relevant to climate change.
2.1 Normal Form Games and the Nash Equilibrium
Denition 2.1 The normal form representation of a game species
1. the set of players in the game (in the context of climate change these will often be
countries), N;
2. a set S of strategy combinations, each strategy combination assigns a strategy to
each player;
3. and the set of payos  = fi : i 2 Ng received by each player for each possible
strategy combination. Each payo i assigns a real number (the utility1) to a
strategy combination.
1It is possible to dene strategic games more generally in terms of a preference relation for each player
on the set of strategy combinations (Osborne, 2003, Chapter 2). It follows from ordinal utility theory
that if a preference relation satises certain axioms, then it is representable by a utility function (Berger,Climate Change and Game Theory 6
The normal form representation of a game is sometimes also known as the strategic form
of a game.
When we consider a player i and strategy combination s, we will often write s i to
denote the strategies of players other than i, and write s = (si;s i).
Denition 2.2 A Nash equilibrium for a normal form representation of a game is a
strategy combination s = (s
i;s








In other words, in the Nash equilibrium every strategy is the best response to the best
strategies of the other players.
An important variation of the concept of a normal form game allows players to play
mixed strategies. Instead of choosing a particular strategy, each player assigns a proba-
bility to each strategy (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994, Chapter 3).
Example 2.1 (The Prisoner's Dilemma). The problem of achieving cooperation to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions is related to the prisoner's dilemma. All countries are
collectively better o if they reduce their emissions, but each country is individually better
o if they continue to pollute. We shall now describe a two player prisoner's dilemma.
Each player has two possible strategies fPollute; Abateg. We represent the payos by
using the payo matrix notation. The two rows correspond to the two possible actions of
the rst player; the two columns correspond to the possible actions of the second player;
the numbers in each box correspond to the payos for each player, with the payo for the
rst player listed rst.
Player 2
Abate Pollute
Player 1 Abate (10;10) (0;11)
Pollute (11;0) (1;1)
: (2)
The strategy pair (Pollute;Pollute) is a Nash equilibrium because given that the second
player chooses Pollute, the rst player is better o choosing Pollute than choosing Abate,
and vice-versa. None of the other strategy combinations are Nash equilibira because in
each case at least one player can improve their payo by changing their strategy. The
1980, Chapter 2), (Ok, 2007, Section B.4).
Assessing the impact on utility of climate change is complicated by several factors (Garnaut, 2008a),
(Stern, 2006): the damages are uncertain, so players are interested in impact on expected utility; damages
can include impacts on non-market goods such as ecosystems; many impacts occur in the future and aect
future generations, so their valuation depends on a discount rate that is likely to take into account the pure
rate of time preference, the marginal elasticity of consumption, and the expected rate of economic growth;
and depends on the risk aversion of the player. Because unmitigated climate change presents potentially
catastrophic risks, the possible impact of highly damaging outcomes can dominate the expected damage
function (Weitzman, 2009).Climate Change and Game Theory 7
strategy pair (Abate;Abate) is known as the social optimum, because the collective payo
(the sum of each player's payo) is maximised. For this example the Nash equilibrium
has a much lower collective payo than the social optimum.
Climate change is similar to a prisoner's dilemma, but countries don't just make a
decision about whether to pollute or not, they make a decision about how much to reduce
their emissions. The following example models this situation.
Example 2.2 (The Global Emissions Game with Continuous Strategy Space).
This example is based on (Finus, 2001, Chapter 9), a more general version of this game
that applies to transboundary pollutants that are not necessarily global pollutants is
described in Finus (2003). This game has a continuous strategy space in that each player
chooses how much pollution to emit, rather than whether to pollute or not. This game
describes a global pollutant, in that the the damages from the pollutant on each player
depend on the total amount of pollution emitted by all of the players. This game could
apply to greenhouse pollution, and also to pollutants that aect the ozone layer. This
game does not examine the dynamic aspects of pollution.
Players can be thought of as countries. We assume that the set of players, N, has size
n. Let ei be the emissions from country i. The utility i of country i is given by






where i are the emissions benet functions and have the property that the derivative
is strictly positive (0
i > 0) and the second derivative is not positive (00
i  0); i are
the emissions damage functions and we assume that their derivatives is strictly positive
(0
i > 0) and the second derivative is non-negative (00
i  0). In other words, the marginal
benets from emissions decrease with emissions, but the marginal damages from emissions
increase.
To calculate the Nash equilibrium, we rst work out what the best response for country
i is if the emissions for all of the other countries are given. This is done by dierentiating















By taking the total derivative of (5) and applying the implicit function theorem, it is
possible to show (see (Finus, 2001, p. 126) or (Finus, 2003, Appendix 2)) that ei can be
expressed as a function of the emissions of the other countries. We call this function theClimate Change and Game Theory 8
best reply function, and we write ei = ri(e i) where e i is the emissions from countries










It is interesting to note that because 00
i is non-negative and 00
i is not positive, it fol-
lows that (6) implies that if some country j reduces its emissions compared to the Nash
equilibrium, then country i's best reply is to increase its emissions. This is because if j
reduces their emissions, the total damages are lower, so the marginal damage function 0
is not as steep.
The Nash equilibrium can be obtained by substituting the best reply functions into
each other and solving for the remaining variable. Suppose that the emission benet
functions are given by






















If there were no damages from emissions (so that c = 0) then the Nash equilibrium would
be e
i = d. The social optimum is given by ei = bd=(b+4c). So the Nash equilibrium does
involve some emission reductions, but less than optimal emission reductions.
Situations where the non-cooperative outcome is sub-optimal are known as social
dilemmas. The above situation assumes that all participants have complete information
about the payos for each other; assumes that decisions are made independently; does
not take into account communication between the participants; and does not consider
how a central authority could enforce agreements among participants about their choices.
If these assumptions are not true, then it is much less certain that a suboptimal non-
cooperative outcome will occur (Ostrom, 2009). When there is communication, decisions
are not made independently, and participants can make enforceable agreement, coopera-
tion may be more likely. But if participants do not have complete information, cooperation
may become more dicult, because players could have an incentive to misrepresent their
preferences.
2.2 Extensive Form Games and the Subgame Perfect Equilib-
rium
The normal form representation of a game hides the sequential nature of strategy and
decision making. By contrast, extensive form games study the sequential nature of gamesClimate Change and Game Theory 9
explicitly. An extensive form game represents the game as a tree. At each node of the
tree, except for terminal nodes, one of the players makes a decision that determines which
node is reached next. Terminal nodes determine the payos of the game.
Denition 2.3 An extensive form game with perfect information (Osborne, 2003, Chap-
ter 5) species
1. the players N in the game;
2. a set of sequences of nodes in the game (terminal histories) with the property that
no terminal history is a proper subsequence of any other terminal history;
3. a function (known as the player function) that assigns a player to any sequence
h that is a proper subsequence of a terminal history { the player function can be
thought of as specifying the player whose turn it is after h;
4. the payos for each player at each possible end node.
Given a history h, the set of all actions available to the player who moves after h is
A(h) = fa : (h;a) is a historyg:
A strategy of a player i in an extensive game with perfect information is a function that
assigns an action in A(h) to each history h after which it is a player i's turn to move. A
strategy combination s determines a terminal history O(s), known as the outcome of s.
Associated with an extensive form game is a normal form representation that we will call
the strategic form of the extensive form game. The strategic form has the same players
and strategy combinations as the extensive form game, and the payos are given by the
payos at the end nodes of each outcome of the extensive form game. If the longest
terminal history of a game is nite, then we say that it has nite horizon.
The strategy combination s in an extensive game with perfect information is a Nash





The Nash equilibrium of an extensive form game is the Nash equilibrium of its strategic
form.
Let   be an extensive form game with perfect information and player function P. For
any non-terminal history h of  , the subgame  (h) following the history h is the following
extensive game:
1. the players are the same as those for  ;
2. the terminal histories are sequences h0 such that (h;h0) is a terminal history of  ;Climate Change and Game Theory 10
3. the player P(h;h0) is assigned to the proper subhistory h0 of the terminal history
(h;h0);
4. the payo in  (h) associated with h0 is equal to the payo in   associated with
(h;h0).
Denition 2.4 A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy combination constituting a
Nash equilibrium in every subgame of the entire game. Equivalently, for every player





where Oh(s) is the terminal history consisting of h followed by the actions generated by
playing strategy s after h.
We will make extensive use of the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Example 2.3 (The Ultimatum Game). In the ultimatum game, there are two players
and a sum of money. The rst player proposes how to divide up the sum of money, and
the second player chooses whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the second player
rejects the proposal, neither player receives anything.
Assume that there is a smallest division of the sum of money available (1 cent say),
that we denote by ". Assume that the total amount of money available is equal to 1 ($1
say) and that 1 is an integer multiple of ". The ultimatum game can be represented by an
extensive form game with two stages. In the rst stage the rst player chooses an amount
of money x 2 [0;1] which is also an integer multiple of ". In the second stage the second
player chooses whether to accept the oer or not. If the second player accepts, the payos
are (1   x;x); if not, the payos are (0;0).
Because the ultimatum game has nite horizon, it is possible to nd the subgame
perfect equilibrium using a technique known as backwards induction. In this technique
the subgame perfect equilibria for the `last' subgames are calculated rst. Then taking
these actions as given, we calculate the equilibria for preceding subgames and so on.
For the ultimatum game, we rst consider the subgames where the second player either
accepts or rejects an oer from the rst player. For any oer x > 0, the second player's
optimal response is to accept the oer. In the subgame when the oer is x = 0, the second
player is indierent about whether to accept or not. There are therefore two equilibrium
strategies for the second player. Either to all accept all payos (including x = 0), or to
accept all payos except for x = 0.
Let us now consider the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy for the rst player.
There are two possibilities:
 If the second player accepts all oers, the rst player's optimal strategy is to make
the oer x = 0, and then recieve the payo 1.Climate Change and Game Theory 11
 If the second player accepts all oers except x = 0, the rst player's optimal strategy
is to make the oer x = ", and recieve the payo 1   ".2
Both of the above possibilities are subgame perfect equilibria, but unless the rst
player is certain that the second player will accept all oers including x = 0, they are
better o making the oer x = ".
Let us now characterise the Nash equilibria of the ultimatum game. The rst player
chooses an amount x in the unit interval [0;1] that is a multiple of ". The second player
chooses a function
f : [0;1] 7! fAccept;Rejectg:
A strategy combination (x;f) is a Nash equilibrium if f(x) = Accept and there is no
y < x such that f(y) = Accept. The rst player would not want to decrease their oer
because the second would reject it; the second would not want to reject the oer because
then they would get nothing. Another Nash equilibrium is the combination x = 0, and
f(x) = Reject for all x. So any possible o could be a Nash equilibrium. In this sense the
Nash equilibrium is a weaker concept than the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Experiments where people have played the ultimatum game have consistently found
that the rst player will usually oer signicantly more money to the other player than
the subgame perfect equilibrium, and the second player will be unlikely to accept the oer
if they are oered less than 30 per cent of the total amount (G uth et al. , 1982).
It has been argued by Fehr & G achter (2000) that the ultimatum game provides
evidence that economic agents don't just base their decisions on pure self interest, and
reciprocal considerations play an important role in people's actions. It has been argued
(Barrett, 2003, pp. 299{301) that the ultimatum game also provides evidence that an
international environmental agreement is more likely to be stable if it is perceived by its
parties to be fair.
Equity considerations play an important role in many proposals for how greenhouse
gas emissions should be allocated in a post-Kyoto protocol. They are one of the reasons
why many proposals (such as Baer et al. (2000); Garnaut (2008b); Meyer (2000)) suggest
that all countries should eventually be allocated the same amount of per-capita emissions.
A shorter transition to equal per-capita emissions would be fairer than a longer transition
because a longer transition rewards high per-capita emitters for having high per-capita
emissions. But even a very short transition to equal per-capita emissions could be con-
sidered to be unfair because dierent countries have dierent historical emissions. Stern
(2009) states (p. 153) that
To suggest that we should all be entitled to emit roughly equal amounts by
2050 is to say that, at the end of the drinking spree, we should be using glasses
2If there was no smallest division of the sum of money, then no oer x > 0 would be optimal, because
x=2 would be better. In this case the only subgame perfect equilibrium corresponds to the oer x = 0.Climate Change and Game Theory 12
of the same size. It is dicult to see this as a particularly equitable division of
the entitlements to the reservoir, since this type of equality takes no account
of all the `drinking' that has gone on over the previous two hundred years.
One alternative approach is for a global total emissions budget that takes into account
historical emissions (Pan et al. , 2000; Project Team of the Development Research Centre
of the State Council, 2009). This approach could be considered to be equitable because
no country imposes an external cost on any other. It would also mean that many coun-
tries would have already used up signicantly more than their emissions budget. Both
approaches would be unlikely to be acceptable to many developed countries. They would
be unlikely to ratify a treaty if it is based on one of these approaches. We discuss the
issue of treaty ratication in Example 2.4.
Example 2.4 (Treaty Ratication). After an international treaty is negotiated, it
then has to be ratied by its participants. This can be modelled as a two stage game.
In Stage 1, the players negotiate the treaty; in Stage 2, each country decides whether
to ratify the treaty. For some countries, for example the United States, ratication can
be dicult. The United States requires 67 out of 100 Senate votes in order to ratify a
treaty. By backwards induction, for negotiators in Stage 1 to play the subgame perfect
equilibrium, they will take into account that a treaty will have to be suciently aligned
with the domestic interests of the United States, in order for it to be ratied by the United
States (Barrett, 2003, p. 148).
It is possible to modify Denition 2.3 so that players can make simultaneous moves.
Instead of having the player function assign a player to a subhistory, it assigns a set of
players. The game also needs to be consistent { the actions corresponding to a subhistory
is the same as the actions of the players assigned by the player function to that subhistory.
The formal denition is as follows:
Denition 2.5 An extensive form game with perfect information and simultaneous moves
species
1. the players N in the game;
2. a set of sequences of nodes in the game (terminal histories) with the property that
no terminal history is a proper subhistory of any other terminal history;
3. a function (known as the player function) that assigns a set of players to any se-
quence h that is a proper subsequence of a terminal history;
4. for each proper subhistory h of each terminal history and each player i contained in
the set of players assigned to h by the player function, a set of actions Ai(h);
5. the payos for each player at each possible end node.Climate Change and Game Theory 13
It is consistent in that h is a terminal history if and only if either
1. h has the form (a1;:::;ak) for some integer k, the player function is not dened at
h and for every l = 0;:::;k   1, al+1 is a list of actions of the players assigned by
the player function to (a1;:::;al), or
2. h has the form (a1;a2;:::) and for every non-negative integer l, the element al+1 is
a list of actions of the players assigned by the player function to (a1;:::;al).
Example 2.5 (The Treaty Participation Game). This example is based on Chapter
7 of Barrett (2003). This and related games are sometimes known as conjectural variation
models (Finus, 2001, Section 13.2) or cartel formation games (Finus & Rundshagen, 2003).
We consider the situation that there are two players and the nal payos are the same as
for the prisoner's dilemma (Example 2.1). This game can be divided into three stages.
Stage 1 All players simultaneously choose whether to be a signatory or a non-signatory.
Stage 2 Signatories choose whether to play Abate or Pollute, with the objective of max-
imising their collective payo.
Stage 3 Non-signatories choose simultaneously whether to play Abate or Pollute.
The subgame perfect equilibrium can be determined by backwards induction, so consider
Stage 3 rst. The Nash equilibrium of the prisoner's dilemma is for players to play Pollute,
so non-signatories will play Pollute.
We now consider the Stage 2 subgame. If there is one signatory, they will anticipate
that the non-signatory will play Pollute in Stage 3, and so will also play Pollute. If both
countries are signatories, they will collectively choose to play Abate, because that will
maximise their collective payo.
In the Stage 1 game, if country Y decides not to become a signatory, then country X
is indierent about becoming a signatory. If country Y decides to become a signatory,
country X is strictly better o if it becomes a signatory. Country X is therefore not worse
o by becoming a signatory regardless of the other players strategy. The subgame perfect
equilibrium therefore has all countries becoming signatories. When countries can make
a continuous choice about their abatement, they will still choose the optimal abatement
level (Barrett, 2003, p. 207).
The extension of the treaty participation game to more than two players has been
investigated in (Barrett, 1994) and (Barrett, 2003, Chapter 7). Using a framework similar
to that of Example 2.2, Barrett considers an agreement where signatories maximise their
collective benets, while non-signatories maximise their individual benets. Each player
is assumed to have the same emissions cost and benet functions. Suppose that there
are n players, and  is the proportion of players that sign an international environmentalClimate Change and Game Theory 14
agreement, so that it has n signatories. Let n() be the payo for a non-signatory, and
let s() be the payo for a signatory. An international environmental agreement is said
to be self-enforcing if
n(   1=n)  s() and n()  s( + 1=n): (12)
In other words, an agreement is self-enforcing if no signatory can benet from dropping
out of the agreement and no non-signatory can benet from joining the agreement. Barrett
found that self-enforcing agreements would be likely to have signicantly less that full
participation. A similar result has also been obtained by Carraro & Siniscalco (1993).
This illustrates a serious barrier to full international cooperation { even when there is
an international agreement, countries can have an incentive not comply with the agree-
ment, to not participate in the agreement, possibly by dropping out of the agreement.
Measures that may encourage include reciprocal measures, side payments, issue linkage,
and trade restrictions3(Barrett & Stavins, 2003). One possible reciprocal measure is for
countries to reduce their emissions by a lesser amount if there is less participation (Bar-
rett, 2003, Chapter 11). Another possible method is to threaten to dissolve the treaty
altogether (see Chander & Tulkens (1997) or Chapter 10 of Barrett (2003)). The prob-
lem with these punishments in the context of greenhouse gas emissions is that they hurt
signatories as much as non-signatories. Threats to substantially increase greenhouse gas
emissions are unlikely to be credible and involves impacts that are experienced decades
into the future. An alternative way to punish non-cooperation is to link cooperation with
another issue, such as trade. Another issue that can be linked to cooperation on reducing
emissions is cooperation on research and development. It may however be dicult to pre-
vent the benets from research and development cooperation from spilling over to other
countries.
Cooperation on global warming is automatically linked to trade through a phenomenon
known as carbon leakage. If a country unilaterally reduces emissions, it could lead to
reduced production of some internationally traded emissions intensive goods. This can
in turn increase the price of the good. The increased price could then drive increased
production of the good in an overseas country that has not reduced its emissions, leading
to economic benets and an increase in emissions for the non-cooperating country.
There are several ways that trade can be linked with cooperation. One way is through
trade restrictions. There is a precedent for this { trade restrictions were incorporated into
the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances. It has been suggested that the
trade restrictions \were indispensable to the protocol's eectiveness" and also helped to
drive the ratication process (Benedick, 1991).
The issue of carbon leakage can also be addressed through border tax adjustments.
When a country has a price on carbon, a border tax adjustment consists of either: (i)
the imposition of a carbon price on imported products that corresponds to a similar
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tax borne by domestic products; and/or (ii) an exemption from paying a carbon price
for the production of exported products. It is likely that border tax adjustments would
be allowed under World Trade Organisation rules (Tamiotti et al. , 2009). Under the
Montreal Protocol, countries accounted for their production of ozone depleting substances,
subtracted their exports, and added their imports. Countries were eectively accounting
for their consumption of ozone depleting substances. If a country applies border tax
adjustments on both exports and imports when it imposes a carbon price, it is eectively
putting a price on the consumption of emission intensive goods rather than the production
of emissions.
Barrett (1997) examined the role of trade sanctions by analysing a game structure
involving both countries and polluting rms. This is an extensive form game with ve
stages: in Stage 1, countries collectively decide whether to employ trade sanctions, and
if so, under what conditions; in Stage 2, countries simultaneously choose whether to be a
signatory to an agreement or not; in Stage 3, signatories choose their abatement levels;
in Stage 4, non-signatories choose their abatement levels; nally in Stage 5, rms choose
their outputs.
Barrett found than for some choices of parameters, when there were trade sanctions
there would be two equilibria. One with no signatories and one with all countries being
signatories. The equilibrium with everyone being signatories is preferable and this one can
be realised by introducing a minimum participation level into the treaty. The treaty only
becomes eective if at least a minimum amount of countries have become signatories. A
similar result was obtained by Lessmann et al. (2009), who used an integrated assessment
model and found that the imposition of taris would increase the level of participation of
a treaty.
It is also possible to link trade with cooperation by applying a tax to fossil fuels
that are exported to a non-cooperating country. Hoel (1994) has suggested that policies
that aect both the supply and demand of fossil fuels are superior to policies that aect
only the supply or only the demand of fossil fuels. A cartel that exports fossil fuels will
capture less rents if other countries reduce their consumption due to an international
climate agreement. It would then be in the interests of the cartel to apply a tax on the
exported fossil fuel (Br aten & Golombek, 1998).
A nal way that trade is linked to cooperation is in international negotiations through
implicit or explicit threats to directly link trade to cooperation.
The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, also known as the Waxman-
Markey Bill, proposes to create a cap and trade emissions reduction scheme in the United
States, and includes provisions for border tax adjustments. At the time of writing, it has
passed the United States House of Representatives and the status of Senate legislation is
uncertain.
The Waxman-Markey Bill proposes to introduce a program for border tax adjustments
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party to an internationally binding agreement in which major greenhouse gas emitting
countries contribute equitably to the reduction of emissions and satises the following
criteria:
1. it has provisions that address carbon leakage between parties and non-parties;
2. it does not prevent countries from addressing carbon leakage between dierent par-
ties;
3. it has agreed remedies for any party that fails to meet their emission reduction
obligations.
The program would apply to eligible industries that are emissions intensive and trade
exposed. Importers of covered goods would need to purchase international reserve al-
lowances, whose price would be equal to the auction price of emissions allowances that
are required for compliance with the cap and trade scheme that would also be introduced
by the Waxman-Markey Bill. It would not apply to imports from countries that meet any
of the following criteria:
1. they are party to an agreement that the United States is also party to, and the
country has greenhouse gas reduction commitments `at least as stringent' as those
of the United States;
2. they are party to a multilateral or bilateral agreement for the eligible sector to which
the United States is also a party;
3. they have an emissions or energy intensity for that industry that is not greater than
that of the United States for that industry;
4. they have been identied by the United Nations as a least developed country;
5. they are responsible for less than 0.5 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions and
less than 5 percent of United States imports for the eligible industry.
It is interesting that there is an emphasis on the strength of emissions reduction
commitments rather than just participation in the agreement. The analysis above suggests
that trade measures can increase the stability of an agreement, but whether trade measures
can be used to directly increase other countries mitigation commitments is unclear. There
is a risk that countries would use trade measures to shift the burden of emissions reductions
from themselves to other countries, and that this could undermine cooperation. Some
parts of the legislation are somewhat vague, the legislation does not specify what is meant
by \at least as stringent" when if refers to greenhouse gas reduction commitments at least
as stringent as those of the United States. For example, it is feasible that a country such
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emissions were approximately 14 times less than the per-capita emissions of the United
States.
India and other developing countries have been highly critical of the border tax adjust-
ment provisions in the Waxman-Markey Bill. The United States President Barak Obama
has also been critical, stating \At a time when the economy worldwide is still deep in re-
cession and weve seen a signicant drop in global trade, I think we have to be very careful
about sending any protectionist signals out there." There is a risk that if any border tax
adjustments or other trade measures are not considered to be fair, then the international
climate regime would also not be considered to be fair, undermining cooperation.
If an in an international climate agreement is self-enforcing, for reasons to do with
issue linkage or otherwise, will the agreed targets be more likely to be close to socially
optimal, or less likely? A related question is whether binding or non-binding targets are
more likely to be strong targets. Game theory suggests that when an agreement is self-
enforcing, players will act under the assumption that other players will comply with the
agreement; when an agreement is not, players are likely to assume that other player will
not comply. If an agreement had strong penalties for non-participation, countries may be
willing to accept targets than they would otherwise accept in order to participate. This
may suggest that binding targets are more likely to be close to socially optimal targets
than non-binding ones.
However, when countries agree to binding targets, the risks associated with these tar-
gets being costly is greater. There is less risk associated with a country agreeing to a
non-binding target, because if a non-binding is dicult to comply with, little is lost by
not complying. Victor (2007) asserts that with international cooperation on the North
Sea, the Baltic Sea, and acid rain in Europe, nonbinding commitments backed by senior
politicians were more eective than binding commitments. For the European acid rain
regime, ambitious non-binding commitments to reduce nitric oxide and nitrogen dioxide
pollutants were adopted by a smaller number of countries alongside a less ambitious bind-
ing convention to address the same pollutant. A domestic mechanism for implementing
such an approach is described in Section 4 of Wood & Jotzo (2009).
Example 2.6 (Repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas). Repeated prisoner's dilemmas are
discussed in (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994, Chapter 8) and (Finus, 2001, Chapter 5). For
repeated prisoner's dilemmas with nite horizon, the only Nash equilibrium consists of
players not cooperating in each turn of the game. When games have innite horizon the
`folk theorems' of game theory tell us that these games have a huge amount of dierent
subgame perfect equilibria. These results suggest that cooperative behaviour is more
likely if players have a long term perspective, and have a strategy for punishing players
who do not cooperate.




Player 1 Cooperate (3;3) (0;5)
Defect (5;0) (1;1)
: (13)
Axelrod organised two computer tournaments where players would submit algorithms that
determine whether to play a cooperative or noncooperative choice on each move, taking
into account the history of the game so far. The rst tournament received 14 entries and
each game would consist of 200 moves. The second tournament received 62 entries, this
time each game would have a 0.00346 chance of ending after each move (so the game
would not have nite horizon).
In both tournaments an algorithm called Tit for Tat won. Tit for Tat starts by
cooperating, then in subsequent moves it plays the preceding move played by its opponent.
Axelrod analysed the highest scoring strategies and found that they would have several
properties in common: they were nice, in that they would not defect before their opponent
does; they were forgiving, they would fall back to cooperating if their opponent does not
continue to defect; but they would also be retaliatory in that they would immediately
defect after an \uncalled for" defection from the other player.
Because repeated games often have a large amount of subgame perfect equilibira,
a stronger concept, known as the `renegotiation proof equilibrium' has been developed
(Farrell & Maskin, 1989).
Because countries make decisions about their emissions over time, and change their
emissions over time, a repeated prisoner's dilemma is in many ways a more appropriate
game to study than a single shot prisoner's dilemma. But there are some important limi-
tations to using repeated games to study greenhouse gas abatement. The most important
limitation is that greenhouse gases are a stock pollutant { the damages from greenhouse
gases are related to cumulative emissions rather than the emissions during any particular
year. Another limitation is that there is quite a bit of delay before the amount of radiative
forcing (and therefore damage) from one tonne of greenhouse gases is maximised.
2.3 Bargaining
The question of bargaining is very relevant to the issue of achieving international coopera-
tion to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In many ways, international climate negotiations
are a bargaining process.
Game theory has looked at bargaining from a number of dierent perspectives. One
of the rst game-theoretic approaches to bargaining was introduced by Nash (1950),
who proposed a solution that maximises the product of each player's improvement in
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viewpoints, as well as looking at problems of strategy and conict. Schelling discusses the
use of pre-commitment to restrict one's options and strengthen one's bargaining position.
For this reason Schelling describes bargaining power as \the power to bind oneself". An
example of the use of pre-committment to strengthen one's bargaining position is the
diculty of treaty ratication in the United States Senate, as described in Example 2.4.
The following example shows how bargaining can be treated as an extensive form
game, and why the subgame perfect equilibrium is important.
Example 2.7 (Split the Pie). This extensive form game was proposed by Rubinstein
(1982). Two players are bargaining over a pie, that we assume to be of size 1. A partition
of the pie is identied with a number s in the unit interval, which we interpret as the
portion of the pie that is received by the rst player. Each player in turn oers a portion
of the pie to the other player, who will either accept it (ending the game) or reject it.
Each player prefers larger partitions of the pie to smaller partitions and prefers the
bargaining to take a shorter amount of time to a longer amount of time. Rubinstein
shows that for any partition s in the unit interval, s is induced by a Nash equilibrium.
Rubinstein shows that this is not necessarily the case for the subgame perfect equilibrium.
The subgame perfect equilibrium is calculated for the situation when there are xed
bargaining costs, and for when there are xed discounting factors. A more general version
of this game is described in (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994, Chapter 7).
3 Coalitions
There have been debates in the game theory literature on whether a cooperative outcome
is more likely to arise from a `grand coalition' of all countries, or from smaller coalitions.
There is also a parallel political debate on the role of the UN in international negotia-
tions. Game theory analyses coalitional behaviour from a variety of perspectives. One
such perspective is a cooperative game theory approach, which we examine in Section
3.1. Another perspective is described in Section 3.2 where we examine non-cooperative
approaches to coalition formation, and the role of externalities.
3.1 Cooperative Game Theory and the Core
Cooperative game theory investigates situations where groups of players may form coali-
tions that enforce cooperative behaviour. For cooperative games, the outcomes of interest
consist of a partition of the players into coalitions, and actions for each coalition. Players
in a coalition behave cooperatively with each other, and non-cooperatively with respect
to other players and coalitions. The core is a concept that can be used to analyse the
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Denition 3.1 Let N be a set of n players. A coalition is a subset S of N. A payo vector
(also known as an imputation) for N is an n-dimensional real vector  = (1;:::;n), and
we write (S) =
P
i2S i for any coalition S  N. A characteristic function  (also known
as a coalitional function) is a function which assigns a real number to each coalition.
We say that a characteristic function  is zero-normalised if (fig) = 0 for i = 1;:::;n;
and that  is super-additive if (S [T)  (S)+(T) for any disjoint subsets S;T of N.
An n-player game in coalitional form with transferrable utility (also called a TU-game)
is dened by a set of players N, and characteristic function , and denoted (N;). The
core of (N;) is dened by
C(N;) = f  : (N) = (N) and (S)  (S) for all S  N g: (14)
The core is the set of possible outcomes in which no coalition can break away from a
grand coalition in such a way that all of its members are better o. The core, being a set,
always exists, but can be empty.
Example 3.1 (The -Core of Chander & Tulkens (1997)). This example is based
on (Chander & Tulkens, 1997), which is also discussed in Chapter 13 of (Finus, 2003) and
Chander & Tulkens (2008). We use the same basic framework as in Example 2.2. Let
i(eS;eNnS) be the payo for a country i in a coalition S which has eS emissions, and with
the other countries emitting eNnS emissions. Assume that each of the countries in NnS
maximise their individual benets, while countries in S maximise their collective benets.
The -characteristic function of a coalition S is the sum of the utilities of each member







The core of the associated TU-game can be thought of as the set of possible payo
vectors for the countries in a grand coalition where no coalition will benet if the grand
coalition dissolves into singletons when any coalition breaks away from it. The payos
depend both on a country's emissions and a transfer ti of payments received by country
i that satises
P
i2N ti = 0. The total payo for country i is given by






Chander and Tulkens show that the -core is non-empty by constructing a payo
vector that is contained in it. Let  ei be country i's Nash equilibrium emissions and let e
i
be country i's social optimum emissions. The values for ti chosen are





















This choice of ti corresponds to an element of the -core if any of the following conditions
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1. damage functions are linear;





3. countries are symmetric.
The result of Example 3.1 suggests that socially optimal emission reductions could be
possible, but it has been questioned whether this outcome is feasible. The threat that
each countries will break into singletons if one or more countries leave the grand coalition
may not be credible. Finus has suggested (Finus, 2001, Section 13.3.3) that variants of the
treaty participation game (as discussed in Example 2.5) may be a more feasible approach.
Finus also points out (Finus, 2001, Section 13.3.3) that the cost sharing rule provides
countries with an obvious incentive to misrepresent their environmental preferences and
abatement costs. In Example 4.6, we shall describe a mechanism where it is optimal for
players to state their their true abatement costs.
Although the cost sharing rule (17) may not be practical or feasible, it is still important
because it demonstrates that the core can be non-empty. This is signicant because it
has been shown (Serrano, 1995), (Okada & Winter, 2002) that it is possible to design
extensive form games (which can be thought of as a bargaining game) whose subgame
perfect equilibria are elements of the core. This relates to the `Nash program' (Nash,
1953; Serrano, 1997) to link cooperative and non-cooperative game theory by nding
non-cooperative procedures that yield cooperative outcomes as their solution concepts.
We note that the core for a global warming game that does not assume that countries
in NnS dissolve into singletons has been studied by Uzawa (2003). In this case the core
may be empty. Uzawa also investigated the situation where utility is non-transferrable.
3.2 Coalition Formation and Externalities
The fully cooperative result from Chander and Tulkens described in Example 3.1 contrasts
with the less cooperative results from Barrett (1994) and Carraro & Siniscalco (1993) that
we discussed in Section 2.2. This has lead to a debate in the game theory literature about
whether cooperation on climate change is best achieved among all countries working
together, or among smaller coalitions. The debate has been surveyed by Tulkens (1998)
and ten years later by Chander & Tulkens (2008). Tulkens (1998) described the results of
Barrett (1994) and Carraro & Siniscalco (1993) as the small stable coalitions (SSC) thesis,
and the results of Chander & Tulkens (1997) as the grand stable coalition (GSC) thesis.
The role of coalitions in the dierent approaches is dierent { under the SSC approach,
the `bad guys' who do not cooperate are singletons, outside of any coalition; under the
GSC approach, the `bad guys' who do not cooperate form a coalition.
When there are coalitional externalities, assumptions about the coalitions that do not
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This in important when analysing issues such as the core, and the stability of a grand
coalition. Chander & Tulkens (2008) point out that an alternative to using characteristic
functions is a `partition function' that also takes as its input a partition of the other
players into coalitions.
The approach of Barrett (1994) and Carraro & Siniscalco (1993) has the property that
the number of non-trivial coalitions is restricted to one; the use of a partition function
facilitates going beyond this assumption. The following denition of a partition function
is from Maskin (2003).
Denition 3.2 Let N be a set of n players and let C be a partition of N into disjoint
coalitions. For each partition C and coalition C 2 C, the partition function (;) assigns
a number (C;C), which is interpreted as the payo for coalition C given the partition
C.
The partition function is zero-normalised if (fig;C) = 0 for all i 2 1;:::;n and all
partitions C of N. It is super-additive if (C1 [ C2;C12)  (C1;C) + (C2;C) for any
partition C of N and coalitions C1;C2 2 C, where C12 is the same as C but with C1 and
C2 replaced by C1 [ C2.
Finus & Rundshagen (2003) have applied partition functions to climate change coali-
tions. They consider a two-stage game, each stage can also be analysed as a game: in
the rst stage countries choose their coalitions; and in the second stage, coalitions choose
their optimal strategy. They consider a large variety of dierent approaches to how coun-
tries choose their coalitions, including the approach of Barrett (1994). These approaches
model the process of coalition formation as an extensive form non-cooperative game. The
size and nature of the coalitions that form depend very much on this process. Some of
these processes (such as the Barrett (1994) approach) have very small coalitions, but in
some cases a grand coalition was possible. Buchner & Carraro (2006) have also used this
two-stage process, and incorporated it with a six-region economic model FEEM-RICE.
How coalition formation can be treated as a non-cooperative game has been discussed
in more general context by Bloch (1996), Ray & Vohra (1997), Yi (1997), and Maskin
(2003). Yi (1997) also found that dierent rules of coalition formation lead to dierent
predictions about stable coalition structures.
For some games coalition formation imposes a positive or negative externality on
other players (Maskin, 2003), (Yi, 1997), (de Clippel & Serrano, 2008). With the basic
framework that we use to analyse climate change (Example 2.2), coalition formation
imposes a positive externality { when a group of countries form a coalition, their emissions
will be lower than when they act individually in a non-cooperative way.
Denition 3.3 Let C be a partition of a set N of n players into disjoint coalitions. Let
C1;C2 2 C be two of these coalitions, and let C12 be the partition that forms when C1 and
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externality on C if merging has no eect, i.e.
(C;C) = (C;C12);
the coalitions C1 and C2 impose a positive coalition externality on C if merging increases
C's payo
(C;C) < (C;C12);
the coalitions C1 and C2 impose a negative coalition externality on C if merging decreases
C's payo
(C;C) < (C;C12):
There is a large variety of non-cooperative coalition formation games that have been
studied. Some of them involve players making simultaneous moves, some involve sequen-
tial moves. We list some of these games below:
 The treaty participation game that was described in Section 2.2 has been studied
by Carraro & Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994), Finus & Rundshagen (2003) and
others. A variant of this game is where players also consider the impact of other
defections that could arise if a player defects from a coalition (Carraro & Moriconi,
1997; Finus & Rundshagen, 2003), and leads to a more cooperative outcome.
 The equilibrium binding agreement game was introduced by Ray & Vohra (1997) and
has also been studied by Finus & Rundshagen (2003). The starting point is a grand
coalition C. Then a smaller coalition, c, may split away from the grand coalition.
In the following step, members of either c or Cnc may propose further deviations.
This process continues until no player wants to split up into ner partitions.
 Open membership games have been studied by Yi (1997) and Finus & Rundshagen
(2003). In these games, players can freely join coalitions and no outsider is excluded
from a coalition.
 Exclusive membership games have been studied by Finus & Rundshagen (2003),
Hart & Kurz (1983), Yi (1997), and Yi & Shin (2000). Players rst simultaneously
list the players who they are willing to join a coalition with. In one type of exclusive
membership game, known as the -Game, two players are in the same coalition if
and only if they are on each others list. In another exclusive membership game, the
 -Game, a group of players are in the same coalition if and only if their lists are all
identical. In their model with symmetric countries, Finus and Rundshagen found
that larger coalitions were sustained by the  -Game than by the open membership
game or the cartel formation game.
 Bloch (1996) and Finus & Rundshagen (2003) have examined the sequential move
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proposes a coalition to which they would like to belong; each prospective member
then is asked (according to the same ordering) whether they accept the proposal; if
all proposed members agree, then a coalition is formed and the remaining players
may form a coalition according to the same process; if a proposed member disagrees,
they can then propose their own coalition.
 Maskin (2003) introduced a sequential process that is also based on an exogenous
ordering, and proved that when externalities were negative, a grand coalition forms
(for up to three players). A counter-example was provided by de Clippel & Serrano
(2008) to this statement when there was more than three players. Maskin also
provided examples of positive externality games where a grand coalition would not
form.
 Aghion et al. (2007) compared two specic bargaining processes, in order to un-
derstand whether multilateral approaches are more likely to lead to cooperation on
trade or bilateral processes were. They only modelled three players, and found that
for the processes that they investigated, a grand coalition would form, even when
coalitional externalities were positive.
The processes described above is a non-cooperative approach to coalition formation.
A signicant question in game theory is which non-cooperative processes can implement
concepts in cooperative game theory. We will discuss how to design non-cooperative
games with cooperative solutions in the next section.
What do coalition formation processes tell us about the role of the UNFCCC in climate
negotiations, if it does indeed tell us anything? Without a credible threat, or forms of
issue linkage such as trade restrictions, a fully cooperative grand coalition seems unlikely.
But this does not in itself make the UNFCCC process unimportant, even though it is
in many ways based on consensus, that can be easily blocked. It is possible to have
negotiations among smaller groups in parallel with the UNFCCC negotiations. This has
been occurring in fora such as the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, and
this is likely to continue. Negotiations among smaller groupings could be complements to
the UN process, rather than substitutes.
The fact that more cooperation is likely to occur with exclusive membership games
than with open membership games could have implications for how to get the most coop-
eration from a coalition formation process. In some ways, the exclusive membership games
are similar to what arises when countries with emissions trading schemes are consider-
ing the possibility of linking their carbon markets. Countries that establish an emissions
trading scheme may want to it it with those of other countries for eciency reasons. But
countries would be reluctant to link with a country whose emissions trading rules are
signicantly dierent (Jotzo & Betz, 2009), or whose mitigation commitment is much less
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4 Implementation Theory
Implementation theory addresses the key game-theoretic question that needs to be an-
swered in order to address a social dilemma. How can non-cooperative games be designed
so that their solution (often a Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect equilibirum) corre-
sponds to a socially optimal outcome? We now will proceed with a formal treatment
of the concepts from implementation theory. We will then examine some mechanisms
that relate to public good provision or pollution reduction, and discuss their relevance to
climate change mitigation. The reader is referred to Jackson (2001) for a more detailed
summary of the main concepts of implementation theory.
Let N be a set of n players, and let A be a set of possible outcomes. Let a player i have
a preference relation Ri on A; if player i prefers an outcome a to another outcome b, or
is indierent, we say that aRib. An example of a preference relation is when each player
i assigns a utility ui to each outcome, in which case, aRib if and only if ui(a)  ui(b).
A social choice correspondence F maps proles of preferences R = fR1;:::;Rng into
the set of outcomes, i.e. F(R)  A. When F(R) is a singleton, F is called a social choice
function. A social correspondence tells us what outcomes are desirable, given a preference
prole. We have made extensive use of the social optimum, a social choice function that
maximises the sum of the utilities of each player.
A mechanism or game form is a pair (M;g) consisting of a product of `message spaces'
or `strategies' M = M1:::Mn, and an outcome function g : M ! A. The main dier-
ence between a mechanism an non-cooperative game is that the result of the mechanism
is given by an outcome, rather than a payo. A solution concept S species the behaviour
of players who have preferences R, given a mechanism (M;g). Given (M;g;R), S species
a subset of M. The outcome function will then lead to an outcome correspondence that
is given by
OS(M;g;R) = fa 2 A : there exists m 2 S(M;g;R) such that g(m) = ag: (18)
Important examples of solution concepts include the Nash equilibrium and the subgame
perfect equilibrium.
A social choice correspondence is implemented by the mechanism (M;g) via a solution
concept S if the outcome correspondence coincides with the image of the social choice
correspondence. In other words,
OS(M;g;R) = F(R): (19)
A eld that is closely related to implementation theory is mechanism design. The mech-
anism design problem involves nding mechanisms where the outcome correspondence
contains the the social choice correspondence, but where there could be other solutions
as well, i.e. OS(M;g;R)  F(R).
The use of subgame perfect equilibrium as a solution concept is particularly important,
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stage via Nash equilibrium, but can be implemented in several stages via subgame perfect
equilibrium (Moore & Repullo, 1988).
Example 4.1 This illustrative example is based on Moore & Repullo (1988). Suppose
that there is a club with a set N of members that are designing a constitution { a
mechanism (M;g) for making decisions. This mechanism could, for example, be a voting
procedure, or a consensus based decision procedure. A social choice function F, together
with the member's preferences R, determine the decision F(R) that would be preferred.
The members preferences R, may be known to each other, but unknown to outsiders,
such as a court. For this reason, instead of directly using F(R) to make a decision, the
constitution species an outcome function g, based on messages M, both of which can be
veried.
An interesting property of this mechanism is that there is no social planner, such as
a government, that implements the mechanism. An example of such a club could be the
UNFCCC, where the decision making body (the `conference of parties') mostly makes
decisions using consensus.
Because mitigation of climate change is a global public good, it is useful for us to
consider non-cooperative games whose solutions implement a public good. We shall now
consider some more examples of games that do this.
Example 4.2 (Subscription Games). Bagnoli & Lipman (1989) describe a relatively
simple game for providing public goods using voluntary contributions. Each player vol-
untarily commits any amount of their choice towards the cost of the public good. The
public good is considered to be discrete { the example of a single streetlight or multiple
streetlights is described. Players `pledge' to make contributions towards completion of
the project. If the total amount of contributions is enough to provide the public good,
then players must pay and the good is provided. If the total amount of contributions
is not enough, each player's contribution is refunded and none the public good is not
provided. Bagnoli and Lipman model this process with a normal form game. They show
that this game has a solution that satises a solution concept known as `undominated
perfect equilibrium'. This solution provides the public good and implements the core of
the economy. This mechanism is also sometimes known as a provision point mechanism.
An extensive form version of this game is described by Admati & Perry (1991). They
call this game the subscription game. The structure of this game is similar to the game in
Example 2.7 in that players take turns to make an oer. For simplicity, assume that there
are two players. Players alternate in pledging contributions to complete the project. The
game ends if and when the total amount of contributions exceeds the cost of the good.
Let ci be the total contribution from player i, let k be the cost of the public good, let
v be the benet of the public good for each player and let T be the rst time such thatClimate Change and Game Theory 27





T(v   ci) if c1 + c2  k
0 otherwise.
(20)
Admati and Perry prove that the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is as
follows.
1. If k > 2v, so that the total cost of the good is greater than its benets, each player
subscribes nothing and the good is not provided.





k   v(1   )
1 + 
; (21)
and the second player subscribes in their rst turn
c

2 = k   c

1: (22)
3. If k < v(1   ), then the rst player subscribes k in the rst move and the good is
provided.
4. If k = v(1   ), then there are two equilibria. In one equilibrium the rst player
subscribes k in the rst move and the good is provided. In the other equilibrium
the second player subscribes k in their rst turn and the good is provided.
Admati and Perry also consider the game where players are not refunded their com-
mitments if the good is not provided. In this case, in equilibrium the good will not be
provided unless the value of the good to each player is greater than the cost of the good.
Marks & Croson (1998) have performed experiments which also suggest that the sub-
scription game can be successful. Advantages of the subscription game are that it is
reasonably simple, and that it does not require a strong sanctioning institution such as
a government that can enforce the desired contributions to public goods.4 Bagnoli and
Lipman state
\Even the analysis of mechanisms which are put forth as `plausibly use-
ful', such as Groves-Clarke taxes, is focused on mechanisms that a government
might actually wish to impose and rarely on mechanisms which private indi-
viduals might jointly use. Perhaps for this reason, the literature on private
provision of public goods has basically ignored the implementation literature,
hypothesized particular games, and demonstrated, among other things, that
these games do not have ecient outcomes." (Bagnoli & Lipman, 1989, p.
596)
4Some sort of institution may still be required to ensure players do not renege on their commitments,
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Example 4.3 (Using Bargaining to Resolve a Non-cooperative Game). Attanasi
et al. (2010) develop a bargaining process that they call a conrmed proposal mechanism
that can lead to cooperative outcomes. They describe two mechanisms: a game form
with `conrmed conditional proposals', and a game form with `conrmed unconditional
proposals'. We describe the game form with conrmed conditional proposals below. These
mechanisms are a little similar to Rubinstein's alternating oers `split the pie' game
(Example 2.7), but do not have a time factor. There is an underlying game (such as a
prisoner's dilemma) that determines the payos for each player. There are two players,
with `strategy spaces' S1;S2 for the underlying game. Pairs of strategies can be thought of
as outcomes, and the underlying game treats these outcomes as strategies that determine
utility functions (which in turn determine the players' preference proles). The mechanism
proceeds as follows:
Stage 1.1 Player 1 communicates to Player 2 their intention to follow a strategy s1
1 2 S1,
if the bargaining process arrives at an agreement.
Stage 1.2 Player 2 responds to Player 1's proposal by communicating their intention to
follow strategy s1
2 2 S2 if Player 1 is willing to conrm their strategy.
Stage 1.3 Player 1 has a choice about whether to conrm their strategy or not. If so,
then the two players choose strategies (s1
1;s1
2); if not, the players proceed to Stage
2.
Stage 2.1 The reply of Player 2 in Stage 1.2 becomes Player 2's new proposal, i.e. s2
2 = s1
2.
Stage 2.2 Player 1 announces their intention to follow strategy s2
1 2 S1, which must be
dierent from their proposal from Stage 1.1 (i.e. s2
1 6= s1
1).
Stage 2.3 Player 2 must choose whether or not to conrm the strategy prole (s2
1;s2;2).
If so, the bargaining process ends; if not, they return to Stage 1, but with the
proposal of Player 1 in Stage 1.1 being the same as their proposal from Stage 2.2,
and the proposal of Player 2 in Stage 1.2 being dierent from their proposal in Stage
2.1.
Attanasi et al. (2010) show that when the underlying game is a prisoner's dilemma
(so that the players' preference proles lead to a prisoner's dilemma), the game has a
subgame perfect equilibrium that induces the cooperative outcome in the rst bargaining
stage. In other words, the cooperative outcome is implemented by the conrmed condi-
tional proposal mechanism, when the player's preferences are a prisoner's dilemma. They
also found that experiments using this mechanism with human subjects sustained high
amounts of cooperation.
The above bargaining mechanism has some similarities to scenarios that can occur in
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to so as part of a `comprehensive international agreement' or something similar. They may
later conrm whether their proposal is an actual commitment or not. For example, some
countries, including Japan and New Zealand, made commitments under the Copenhagen
Accord that are conditional on actions from other countries. During the negotiations at
Copenhagen in 2009, Russia stated that a previous commitment from their President for
a 2020 emission level that is between 20 and 25 percent less than their 1990 commitment
level was based on \a substantive, comprehensive agreement as a solution to the long-term
cooperative action track of the negotiations".
Another form of conditionality that takes place during climate negotiations is when
countries state that they will make an unconditional commitment, but are willing to
increase their emission reductions based on the commitments of others. For example,
at Copenhagen the EU had an unconditional commitment to reduce its emissions by 20
percent compared to 1990 levels by 2020, but would be willing to reduce its emissions
by 30 percent compared to 1990 levels if there was a sucient commitment from other
countries. Australia made an unconditional commitment to reduce its emission by 5
percent compared to 1990 levels by 2020, and a commitment to increase that by up to 15
percent if certain commitments were met, and to 25 percent if certain other conditions
were met. These kinds of approaches are in many ways similar to the provision point
mechanism of Example 4.2, but are also similar to the `matching abatement commitment'
approach described below.
Example 4.4 (Matching Abatement Commitments). A game where players com-
mit to reducing their emissions by a multiple of other player's targets on top of their un-
conditional commitments is considered by Boadway et al. (2009). Each country chooses
a matching rate and its level of direct abatement. The game proceeds as follows:
Stage 1 Each country i simultaneously chooses matching rates mij that correspond to
country j's direct abatement.
Stage 2 Each country i simultaneously chooses their direct abatement levels ai. After
Stage 2, the total abatement commitment of country i is




Stage 3 Countries engage in trading of their emission quotas to equalise the marginal
benets of emissions across all countries.
Boadway et al. (2009) show that the subgame perfect equilibrium of this process achieves
the ecient level of pollution abatement. They extend their model to a situation with
two time periods, and treat the pollutant as a stock pollutant (so that it can build up
in the atmosphere). They show that the above process also eciently allocates emissions
across periods.Climate Change and Game Theory 30
The previous three mechanisms all have cooperative outcomes, and all are based on
some sort of conditionality. The fact that their solutions are cooperative suggests that a
cooperative approach to climate mitigation is possible. This contrasts with less optimistic
views, such as from Brennan (2009), who states that the grounds for hope are \decidedly
thin".
These mechanisms require that countries can make a commitment that they cannot
backtrack from at each stage of the mechanism. It suggests that if an international legal
architecture is devised for cooperation on climate change, a mechanism that makes `legally
binding' conditional commitments possible would be desirable. A novel approach to get
countries to make commitments that they will not backtrack from is described below.
Example 4.5 (A Deposit Based Compliance Mechanism). A two-stage mechanism
to provide public goods when there are not strong institutions has been described by
Gerber & Wichardt (2009). We assume that there is an underlying public goods game
such as the game in Example 2.2. In Stage 1, each player is required to pay a deposit.
In Stage 2, there are two possible outcomes. If not all players paid the deposit in Stage
1, then the deposits are refunded and the underlying public goods game is played. If all
players paid the required deposit, then in Stage 2 players are required to make a pre-
specied contribution to the public good. If a player makes the contribution, they get
their deposit back. If their contribution is less than what was specied, they do not.
Gerber and Wichardt show that provided the deposits satisfy a certain inequality, and
the payos for each player are greater when all players contribute the specied contribu-
tion than when nobody does, then it is a subgame perfect equilibrium for each player to
contribute the specied amount to the public good. The mechanism discourages players
from reneging from their commitments because by making a deposit prior to the con-
tribution stage, they make it a dominant strategy to comply with the agreement. The
action of paying the deposit can be thought of as a way for players to execute their own
punishment, rather than have to punish anyone else.
An institution is required to collect deposits, monitor players' contributions, and re-
fund deposits. The institution does not have to implement the provision of the public
good itself, or enforce punishments of free-riders.
In many of the situations described here, such as Example 2.2, players' preferences
are known. An important issue in implementation theory is how to nd mechanisms
that induce players to reveal their preferences. A signicant problem with achieving
international cooperation is that players often have strong incentives to misrepresent their
abatement costs and environmental preferences. In the climate negotiations, countries
have an incentive to exaggerate their abatement costs in order to negotiate a weaker
target for themselves or reduce the likelihood of being committed to a target. We shall
now examine a mechanism that induces players to reveal their true abatement costs.Climate Change and Game Theory 31
Example 4.6 (An Auction that Induces Truthful Bidding). We describe an auc-
tion mechanism for pollution licences in which the amount of licences are endogenous to
the auction. Players have an incentive to bid truthfully and their payments are equal
to the externality they impose.5 This mechanism was introduced in (Montero, 2008),
and applications to global warming have are described in (Montero, 2007b). We consider
an administrator and some players. In a national setting, the administrator could be a
government and the players could be rms. In an international setting, the administrator
could be some other sort of institution and the players could be countries.
The mechanism works in the following way. Firstly the administrator species a
damage function for the pollutant. Then each player submits a schedule of how much
they are willing to pay for each licence. Finally the administrator announces the price
and amount of permits auctioned, and also a payment to each player. The role of the
payment is to induce each player to bid truthfully.
Let  be the emissions damage function which satises 0 > 0 and 00  0. Let Pi be
the emission demand function for player i, which satises P 0
i  0. The demand function
can be thought of as the marginal benets of emissions for player i, the derivative of the
emissions benet function. This setting is slightly dierent to the setting of Example 2.2
in that we are dealing with an aggregate damage function rather than a damage function
for each player. When a player i submits a bid, it submits what it claims to be its benet
function ^ Pi that is supposed to approximate Pi. Because 0 > 0, it is possible to dene
an inverse function S, which we call the administrator's supply function, that satises
S(0(x)) = x and represents the amount of licences that the administrator would be
willing to sell at a particular price. Because ^ P 0
i < 0, it has an inverse function ^ Xi, the
demand schedule, which satises ^ Xi( ^ Pi(x)) = x.
For each player i, the administrator computes the residual supply function Si, using
the other players reported demand schedules,




Each Si satises S0
i > 0, and so has an inverse that we call the residual marginal damage
function 0
i, satisfying 0
i(Si(p)) = p. The administrator clears the auction by determining
a price pi and a number of licences li such that




li = Si(pi) = ^ Xi(pi): (26)
5Mechanisms that induce players to bid truthfully and pay the cost of the externality that they impose
are known as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms. Another mechanism with these properties is described
by Dasgupta et al. (1980).Climate Change and Game Theory 32





So pi does not depend on i, and each player pays the same licence price p.
Each player is also paid by the administrator an amount i(li), which is set to be










It is optimal for each player to bid their true demand curve by setting ^ Pi = Pi, regardless
of what other players bid (Montero, 2008, Proposition 3).
We shall now look more closely at how this mechanism will work in the context of
climate change. It will be simpler to rst consider how it would work in a national
setting, where a government is using this mechanism to auction some annual permits for
emitting greenhouse gases. Greenhouse gases are stock pollutants, so dierent levels of
greenhouse gas pollution from a single country in a single year will have a very small eect
on the marginal damage function (also known as the social cost of carbon) 0. We can
therefore assume that there exists a very small " > 0 such that 00 < ", and that there
is some price ~ p > 0 such that 0(x) is approximately equal to ~ p for all x. It then follows
that




So when " is so small that it is negligible, the auction mechanism will be equivalent to
a carbon tax. This is consistent with players having less of an incentive to misrepresent
their abatement costs under a carbon tax. However, there are reasons why a government
would choose a dierent damage function. Stern (2009) notes (p. 101) that
The social cost of carbon is calculated by estimating the damages created
by the emissions of an extra unit of carbon, keeping in mind that this extra
unit results in higher concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
over the very long term. That calculation depends on the assumptions made
on the future path of the economy and of emissions, the strength of the carbon
cycle shaping absorption, climate sensitivity, distributional and intertemporal
values, and so on. If you also factor in assumptions about probability dis-
tributions of all those things and attitudes to risk, you can get a huge range
of estimates for the social cost of carbon. This means that the social cost of
carbon is a very weak and unreliable peg for policy.
A commonly suggested alternative to a carbon tax is an emissions trading scheme, which
can be thought of as having the government choose some amount of licences ~ l; lettingClimate Change and Game Theory 33
0(x) = 0 for x < ~ l; and letting 0(x) be innite for x > ~ l. A hybrid approach is described
in (Roberts & M. Spence, 1976), where the administrator approximates a marginal damage
function with a piecewise constant function. The auction described here can be thought
of an a mechanism for implementing general hybrid approaches to control emissions.
Montero (2007b) suggests that one way for countries to nd out their mitigation costs
would be to have an auction at the national level. This could then inform an auction at
the international scale. In an international situation, the amount of emissions involved
are greater than at the national level. The emissions from a single player i are likely to
have a greater impact on the marginal damage function 0, so 00 is likely to be greater,
and i is likely to be greater. A signicant barrier to implementing this mechanism is
that it is not revenue neutral. Players are unlikely to want to participate if it involves
signicant wealth transfers to a third party. A system of paybacks is described in Montero
(2007a) which comes close to being budget balancing, and becomes closer to being budget
balancing when there are more players.
There are some other barriers that would need to be addressed if this mechanism was
to be used internationally in practice. An institution would be required to both administer
the auction and transfer the payments. There would also be the issues of potential non-
compliance and non-participation. Finally, a mechanism for players to agree on a damage
function would be required. This mechanism may be somewhat more complicated than
some of the other mechanisms described in this section. Regardless of whether it is
feasible at the international scale, it is of theoretical interest, and informs decisions about
the choice of instrument for pricing greenhouse gas emissions.
5 Conclusion
In its simplest form, climate change mitigation is a prisoner's dilemma. The prisoner's
dilemma has a Nash equilibrium that involves players acting non-cooperatively in a man-
ner that is socially sub-optimal. When countries have a continuous choice about how
much to pollute, the Nash equilibrium involves much more pollution than is optimal.
This is why climate change is sometimes known as a social dilemma.
Normal form games such as this help us to understand the free-rider problem, but do
not tell is about the sequential nature of strategic behaviour. Being able to do this is
important for addressing the social dilemma.
Extensive form games that have more than one stage, such as the treaty participation
game, can have solutions that are more cooperative, as their subgame perfect equilibrium.
For two players, the treaty participation game implements a cooperative outcome. But
for more than two players, there is only partial cooperation. Ways to address this may
include the use of punishments; and issue linkage, possibly involving trade. The subgame
perfect equilibrium also helps us to understand the process of treaty ratication and itsClimate Change and Game Theory 34
strategic implications.
However, solution concepts such as the Nash equilibrium and the subgame perfect
equilibrium do have limitations. Experiments using the ultimatum game illustrate this,
by illustrating that human behaviour not only inuenced by strategic considerations, it
is also inuenced by reciprocity and conceptions of fairness. Disciplines which help us
understand human behaviour in these situations is a very useful complement to the use
of game theoretic solution concepts.
When game theory is used to help us understand coalitions, outcomes that are more
cooperative than the treaty participation game are possible. A socially optimal outcome
has been predicted by Chander & Tulkens (1997), using cooperative game theory and
the concept of the -core. However, this outcome is based on a threat that might not be
credible, so may not be realistic. But many non-cooperative models of coalition formation
have subgame perfect equilibria that are more cooperative than predicted by the treaty
participation game, including several that were studied by Finus & Rundshagen (2003).
Because one of the coalition formation processes, the exclusive membership game, has as
a signicantly more cooperative solution that some of the others, it may be the case that
carbon market linkage can help facilitate a cooperative outcome.
There are several strong results about mechanisms that implement a cooperative out-
come via subgame perfect equilibrium when there is a social dilemma. These include
subscription games (Example 4.2), bargaining based on conrmed proposals (Example
4.3), and approaches where countries `match' each others pollution abatement commit-
ments (Example 4.4). All of these approaches make use of conditionality. This suggests
that when countries are willing to increase their emission reduction commitment if others
do the same, cooperation is more likely. It also suggests that cooperation would be more
likely if an international mechanism were to exist that would allow countries to make a
binding conditional commitment.
Game theoretic approaches inform our understanding of participation and compliance
in international agreements, the role of coalitions, and the role of conditionality when
bargaining over emission reductions. This can help us understand the social dilemma
associated with climate change and provide insights that may help us address it.
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